The what and how of equivalencies Juan D. Delius
Allgemeine Psychologie. Konstanz University. Germany I believe that we have to be grateful to Francois Tonneau for undertaking the overdue job of clearing out the conceptual and semantic overgrowth that had engulfed behavioural equivalence research and was increasingly turning this area into a matter of a quasi-theological dispute. I hope that henceforth editors and referees will be less facile about laying down the laws on what facts demonstrate or do not demon strate an equivalence relation and on what terminology is the right one and which is the wrong one. Although here and there I would have wished Tonneau to have been even more explicit and extreme in his critique, I shall certainly not attempt to better the substance of his arguments about whom, where, when and what went logically astray about equivalence relations. I also do not want to become involved with the question of what would be the right behaviouristic concep-. tual framework for investigating language acquisition as I feel that many song-birds, an African grey parrot and certain bonobos can tell us more about that than Skinner, Sidman or even Tonneau can (Delius, 1990 ; see also Xia, Siemann, & Delius, 2000; Xia, Emmerton, Siemann, & Delius, 2001) .
Instead, I want to underline the fact that organisms were not created for the purpose that behaviour analysts might at some future time work out all the (divine?) rules according to which they were designed to behave. Rather, organisms are the outcome of a chancy game-like process where the laws of behaviour are more determined by the government of competitive Darwinian fitness than by any fundamental principles of logic, or indeed mathematical set theory. Within the evolutionary game, sensory organs, the nervous system and response equipment are all costly devices that only pay-off if they promote fitness in a commensurate way. The capacity of learning is one of the strategic avenues by which brains can contribute to enhance the survival and reproduction of tlleir bearers. Myriads of stimulus events and states can be signalling the where and when of fitness-promising and -threatening situations. There are far fewer adaptively meaningful response options available to organisms tllan there are stimulus constellations and stimulus sequences which it may be worthwhile to learn about. In terms of information flow from the receptive interface to the responsive interface, the more advanced brains are necessarily confronted with a drastic bottleneck problem. Two main strategies seem to have evolved to produce tlle necessary compression of information. One is for brains to disregard large portions ~f the sensory inflow at any time (e.g., ignore food stimuli when attempting to have sex) and the other is· to respond in the same way to many different stimuli (e.g., ingest everything tllat is nourishing) . It is reasonably clear that the formation of stimulus equivalencies, in a wider sense, is primarily part of this latter adaptive strategy and that this process only very secondarily has to do with the development of symbolic behaviour, although symbolic responses may well facilitate equivalence formation.
In common parlance equivalency refers to the characteristic that diverse items can sometimes turn out to be at least partially exchangeable with respect to some property. At present in Argentina pesos are equivalent to American dollars as CU1'fency because there is a fiscally guaranteed oneto-one exchange rate. Of course, tllis is not effectively so everywhere -a remote village hotel might refuse to take dollars and nobody in the United States would accept pesos. The equivalence also may not last forever, as there are plans to tie the peso to the euro instead of the dollar. Dollar and peso paper-bills look distinctly dif-ferent, although not altogether so because they are both rectangles of printed paper. And indeed, there are some confusingly similar Spanish peseta bills that are certainly not a dollar's worth.
Another more real-life example: to Panamanian cebus monkeys that I watched many years ago it apparently was much the same whether they fed from a fig somewhat alike but in another respec;t they were not: one was occasionally visited by a monkeyeating eagle and the otller was sometimes guarded by a rifle-carrying farmer. Indeed, the monkey's behaviour was very clearly discriminative on this accoun t: when nearing the trees they would regularly utter either aerial predator or ground predator alarm calls. In short, for organisms sets of diverse stimuli judged by varying cues may become equivalent with respect to varied behavioural roles or functions but rarely, if ever, will that equivalence be absolute and exclusive, and indeed, with respect to other functions t11ey may be kept quite separate. At t11e outset, to assume t11at these kinds of facts can be squeezed into a framework of mathematical logic seemed to me to be rather preposterous. Every behavioural scientist is naturally free to tighten up the definition of what an equivalency relation must consist of. But tl).ere is t11e risk t11at he may strain t11e commonly accepted meaning of the term beyond recognition, and that he might begin to arbitrarily exclude phenomena t11at are suitably captured by t11at same term. Admittedly though, a tight formal corset can often be heuristically useful in helping to organise research along systematic lines rat11er t11an along haphazard byways. Sidman's stern prescriptions certainly have done that.
Stimuli can be (nearly) equivalent because they are neighbours on some physical dimension and are t11us perceived as being confusingly similar. Note that the perceptual similarity is the really important criterion. Shades of red and shades of green are each readily classed as belonging to two separate equivalence classes by people of normal colour-vision but red-green blind persons can hardly avoid classing t11em as belonging to' a single class. The generalisation between the shades of red stimuli in normal subjects can, however, be broken by discriminative conditioning, and, conversely, tlle perceptual distinctiveness between red and green can be behaviourally overridden when both hues serve as conditional stimuli for food with, for example, white light serving as conditional stimulus for no-food. Stimuli may also be perceptually similar not be-. cause they are dimensional neighbours but because t11ey have features in common such as 'a beak, two legs, two wings and feathers. And again there mayor may not be generalisation about whether all t11ese features are necessary for inclusion in a given class or not and about a feature being accepted as a wing or as, say, a flipper (penguins!). But stimulus items may also be similar or different according to less direct criteria. As I write tllese lines a pair of blackbirds in my garden are searching for a nesting place and they are looking into a whorl in t11e ivy by the house wall, the broken housing of a garden lamp and a particular fork within a thicket of bushes. For t11e moment all these different sites seem to be equivalent in t11e sense that the blackbirds are carrying bits of nest material to each of them. But I know that by tomorrow this indiscriminate behaviour will cease and the blackbirds will have settled for one of the sites for who knows what reasons. To tlle same blackbirds a very diverse set of items W {e cats, squirrels, magpies, crows, snake, and even egg-collecting urchins, turning up near the chosen place will soon become equivalent as potential nest-predators, all being indistinctly mobbed because of what they can do rat11er t11an what t11ey look like. How blackbirds can come to treat all t11ese things as t11e same is a special conditioning story by itself (Curio, 1988) . These are all equivalencies t11at formal set theory is not usefully informative about.
A probably sounder approach is to be rat11er open minded about what constitutes the demonstration of an equivalence relation between stimuli, or indeed an equivalence class of stimuli, and to proceed in a mainly operational and somewhat eclectic manner. For example, independently of whether Sidman's theoretical framework is adequate or not, it is intrinsically interesting within the matching-to-sample task to ask why preschool humans, mentally-defective humans and animal species as a rule do not exhibit an untaught emergence of the reflexivity relation. If they learned that sample stimulus A symbolically matched comparison stimulus B why are they not prepared to spontaneously respond to comparison A as directly matching itself? A number of proposals have been made but it is still fair to say that it has not yet been well explained why normal adult hurpans do and the other subjects mentioned do not. Similarly, why do these latter subjects, having been taught the A-> B relation as a rule, do not exhibit the untaught symmetric relation B-> A? As far as the failures of pigeons are concerned, it is undoubtedly important tha t when these emergent relations are tested they have normally never before experienced the stimulus A on the side keys. In fact, pigeons need much convincing that exactly the same colour stimulus presented in the frontal and the lateral visual field is equivalent (Mallin & Delius, 1983) . In view of the circumstance that stimulus position is a salient cue for pigeons could it be that A-centre key is a perceptually quite different stimulus from A-side key? Would an experimental design that bypasses this circumstance yield better evidence of reflexivity and symmetry? As far as adult normal humans are concerned their success may be less if the experimental subjects are pressed for fast reaction times both during tlle A-> B learning and the later testing? There is much evidence that under the latter conditions humans can not bring to bear what is known as explicit knowledge and have to rely on an implicit knowledge which mostly is much closer to what animals normally seem to learn.
Because pigeons are rather obtuse with the symbolic matching-to-sample task our laboratory has turned to another type of equivalence producing task. It derives from a procedure originally suggested by Lea (1984) and first successfully used by Vaughan (1988) ( but see also Sidman, Wynne, Macguire, & Barnes, 1989!) . It was modified by us in a way that enabled the analysis of the associations between a few artificial stimuli (Delius, Ameling, Lea ,& Staddon, 1995; Siemann 51 & Delius, 1998a; Fersen & Delius 2001) . The subjects were taught the symmetrical functional equivalencies Al <-> Bl and A2<-> B2 through concurrently learning the simultaneous discrimination tasks Al +A2-and Bl +B2-, then learning the reversed tasks Al-A2+ and Al -B2+, then again the re-reversed tasks Al +A2-and Bl +B2-, and so forth, several times. Al, Bl, A2 and B2 were four different stimuli arbitrarily allocated to sets 1 and 2. The + and -symbols indicate tlle food reward and time-out penalty reinforcemen ts issued upon responses to tlle respective stimuli. Across the successive reversal training stages tlle A and B stimuli were operationally linked togetller through a super-contingency which ensured that whenever the Al stimulus indicated reward, the Bl stimulus did so too and that whenever A2 indicated reward B2 did the same, with the converse arrangements applying to the signaling of penalties. When the pigeons performed the two reversing discrin1inations task well, tlley were first taught tlle reversal of only one of the discrin1i-nation tasks, for example Al-A2+, and probe trials were then inserted to test whether dle subjects transferred the adequate responding to the otller stimulus pair 01ere Bl B2). Positive results with tIlls test, and witll the converse test with Bl +B2-training trials and Al A2 probe trials, were taken to indicate that the subjects had been effectively taught the symmetrical Al <-> Bl and A2<-> B2 equivalence relations (summarily, the A <-> B equivalencies).
More recently, Masako Jitsumori, while visiting our laboratory considerably expanded and refined this methodological approach (Jitsumori, Siemann, Lehr ,& Delius, 2001 ; see also Delius, Jitsumori, & Siemann 2000; Jitsumori & Delius, 2001) . Two sets of up to six visual stimuli each (A, B, C, D, X, y) were involved. With an improved procedure the pigeons were first sequentially taught the equivalencies A<->B, C<->D, A <->C and B<-> D through repeated synchronous reversals of a corresponding number of simultaneous discrin1ination tasks. They were then tested as to whether they had acquired these equivalencies symmetrically and also tes ted whether they had derived the untaught transitive symmetrical equivalence relations A <-> D and B<->C. Altllough equivalency-appropriate re-sponding to probes was observed in some of the pigeons that dealt with sets composed of arbitrarily allocated stimuli, this choice responding was much enhanced in pigeons which dealt with stimuli that were selected to be physically somewhat similar within each set and somewhat different between sets. But it was not that the equivalencies arose by spontaneous, unconditioned stimulus generalization. The basic equivalencies had to be decidedly taught for the stimulus similarities to have a supportive effect. \'V'hen these birds were then trained to assimilate arbitrarily different stimuli X and Y into the equivalence network they already commanded, they arguably did somewhat better, as judged by tests, in forming equivalencies with these additional stimuli than those birds that had to deal with arbitrarily divided stimuli right from the beginning. Note that descriptively the equivalence classes that were formed agreed better with fuzzy set theory than with deterministic set theory. The choiceresponse transfer to the probe stimuli, though significantly correct, was virtually never errorless. An important result was that taught equivalencies led to the transitive emergence of untaught equivalencies which were, furthermore, symmetrical. Although in the equivalence sense the pigeons thus generalized freely between the stimuli constituting each equivalence class they nevertheless had no difficulty with discriminating between them when they were later conditioned to do so (A+B-, B+C-, etc.).
There is thus more to equivalence than symbolic matching-to-sample. But regardless of tl1at, what we really want are explanations of how it all works. At the risk of thoroughly displeasing the readers of this journal, in my mind explanations of behavioural performances need to be computable, though not through some learning theory algebra or with some artificial intelligence algoritl1m. They should be cast in terms of neural networks aimed at sketching how tl1e required information processing might proceed in actual brains. Networks that work with unrealistic back propagation-based weight adjustments are really out of court as are networks that are largely unstructured before the learning phase begins. Transsynaptic antidromic conduction is too rare in real brains and evolutionarily-genetically pre-structuring of brains is too well documented to be ignored. \'(!e have endeavored to devise more realistic networks that operate on the basis of classical and instrumental conditioning principles. They can successfully simulate various instances of complex, cognitive learning (Siemann & Delius, 1998b) . It is fairly easy to have such a network to mimic the learning and emergence of reversal equivalencies described by Jitsumori at al. and preliminary work suggests tl1at also matching-tosample equivalency a la Sidman may be straightforwardly implementable by the same kind of neural network (Delius & Ahrens, in prep.) . The gist of any stimulus equivalency build-up is simply that through connectivity weight-change brought about by conditioning, the information about the various class members comes to converge on a single intermediate, hidden unit or a heavily interconnected cluster of such units. This is reminiscent of the common coding account of equivalence formation. Stimulus generalization, whether conditioned or unconditioned, generally has to rely on an analogous convergence. The extent to which equivalence learning and emergence is rapid and ' successful or not is determined by the degree of network preadaptedness in terms of local connectivity patterns and of local connectivity modifiability.
